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A B S T R A C T
Neoclassical valuation methods often measure the contribution that non-market goods make to utility as income
compensations. This circumvents Arrow's impossibility (AI) –a theoretical proof establishing the impossibility of
social preferences – but those methods cannot be used in all settings. We build on Arrow's original proof,
showing that with two additional axioms that allow for social learning, a second round of preference elicitation
with a social announcement after the first, generates logically consistent social preferences. In short: deliberation
leads to convergence. A ‘web-game’ aligning with this is trialed to select real world projects, in a deliberative
way, with the board of an Australian Aboriginal Corporation. Analysis of the data collected in the trial validates
our theory; our test for convergence is statistically significant at the 1% level. Our results also suggest complex
social goods are relatively undervalued without deliberation. Most non-market valuation methods could be
easily adapted to facilitate social learning.
1. Introduction
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment emphasized the importance
of properly measuring the impact of social decisions on ecosystems
given their importance to human wellbeing (Bullock et al., 2018). That
this notion has been widely accepted is evidenced by the rapid growth
in studies that seek to do that – often using neoclassical non-market
valuation methods to generate estimates and with large organizations
supporting the endeavor (see, for example, The Economics of Ecosys-
tems and Biodiversity (Braat and De Groot, 2012)).
Neoclassical methods have done much to highlight the importance
of numerous non-market goods and services, including various eco-
system services, but cannot measure the value of all goods and services
(Cook et al., 2017). They are adept at measuring the value (in terms of
income compensation) of simple individual goods – herein denoted as
SIG and defined as a good that generates a simple/singular benefit (e.g.
more income or more food) which accrues to an individual, but struggle
to adequately measure relational values (Chan et al., 2016), with some
arguing that neoclassical methods are, by definition, incommensurable
with them (Kallis et al., 2013; Oberheim and Hoyningen-Huene,
2009).1 Neoclassical methods are not yet adept at measuring the value
of complex social goods (Stoeckl et al., 2018) – herein denoted CSG and
defined as goods that generate a diverse range of benefits2 that accrue
to a diverse range of people at multiple social scales (e.g. to individuals,
families, communities and/or society more broadly). This is because
neoclassical methods are essentially partial equilibrium in nature –
specifically designed to assess the value of singular/simple goods that
generate benefits for individuals, whilst assuming all else is constant
(and that individual preferences/utility functions, are independent).
The social valuation of ecosystem services (particularly those that are
essentially CSGs), which allows one to deduce social preference, thus
remains an open problem for contemporary ecological economics
(Kenter et al., 2015; Kenter et al., 2016).
Social and individual preference are context dependent (Tversky
and Simonson, 1993; Chan et al., 2016; Hansjürgens et al., 2017), have
plurality of values (Himes and Muraca, 2018; Rawluk et al., 2019) and
align with non-anthropocentric ideals (Batavia and Nelson, 2017).
Importantly, having a plurality of value means that different things of
value elicit different responses in individuals that sit within a socially
constructed context (Tadaki et al., 2017). Likewise, Kuhn's monist
emphasis at the individual level aggregates to plurality at the social
level (Šešelja and Strasse, 2013). For example, making eye contact may
be seen in a plural way across individuals. It may be conceived as re-
spectful or aggressive depending on the social context. This means that
the value an individual places on a good or service when asked to
consider only their own personal preferences may be quite different
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from the value they place on that good or service if asked to consider
the views of (or for) a group (Arias-Arévalo et al., 2018); and pre-
ferences that apply for one group may differ from preferences that are
appropriate for another.
Neoclassical non-market valuation methods are proficient at mea-
suring value from the perspective of an individual, but deliberative
processes (Hansjürgens et al. (2017); Himes and Muraca (2018)) and
group learning (Sagoff, 1998) are thought to be better suited to the task
of assessing social/collective values. Importantly, Sagoff (1998) pro-
vides examples of cases where contingent valuation has been erro-
neously applied. Some consider there to be a lack of theoretical un-
derpinning for deliberative valuation (Bunse et al., 2015) – an issue
addressed in this paper. Deliberative approaches attempt to elicit social
values by explicitly encouraging discussion amongst individuals
(Kenter et al., 2015). In practice this can take the form of an initial
elicitation, a follow-up discussion amongst individuals and a final eli-
citation used to inform the valuation (Hansjürgens et al., 2017). The
deliberations thus provide a mechanism to reveal values that explicitly
account for connections between people and assets (Himes and Muraca,
2018; Chan et al., 2018).
Many deliberative approaches (termed deliberative valuations, by
Hansjürgens et al. (2017)) elicit preferences as income compensations –
e.g. as willingness to pay – and thus approach the valuation task from
an essentially neoclassical economics standpoint. However, whilst
monetization informs social decision-making and allows one to in-
corporate values using cost benefit analysis (CBA), it is Taboo to trade-
off some values in monetary terms (Kallis et al., 2013; Daw et al., 2015),
commoditizing ecosystem services can lead to a long-term problems for
biodiversity conservation (Gómez-Baggethun and Ruiz-Pérez, 2011)
and over-reliance on monetized values can contribute to the crowding
out of CSGs (Stoeckl et al., 2018). Deliberative approaches which elicit
preferences in other ways, termed deliberative institutions, by
Hansjürgens et al. (2017), thus offer themselves as an attractive alter-
native in some settings.
Methods which seek to identify social preferences by first asking
individuals to rank preferences (without using money as a metric), and
second aggregating individual preferences to generate a social ordering,
are, however, vulnerable to criticism by neoclassical economists on
(Arrow's) theoretical grounds (Kenter et al., 2015). Crucially, CBA and
related non-market valuation methods that capture preferences in terms
of income compensations do not require one to directly measure social
welfare (instead only asking if changes will improve it). As such, they
circumvent Arrow's impossibility (AI) the name used for a theoretical
‘proof’ that it may be impossible to derive logically consistent social
preferences directly, e.g. with voting (Arrow, 1950).
It is nowadays widely accepted that AI holds in some situations, but
not all (formally, if one restricts individual preferences to ensure it is
possible to maintain logical consistency when aggregating individual
preferences to a social order (Sen, 1977)). However related ‘solutions’
to AI involve excising potentially problematic individual preferences
(Sen, 1999; Inada, 1969). This is computationally intractable for a large
number of goods and individuals, limiting the usefulness of these ‘so-
lutions’ in real world settings. The lingering shadow of AI thus makes it
difficult for approaches that do not measure values using money as a
metric to gain traction as rigorous alternatives to the norm. In this
paper, we seek to redress that problem.
In Section 2 we provide a proof that deliberative methods, which
incorporate ‘social learning’, do not suffer from AI and are thus theo-
retically sound – even if preferences are only measured using ratings
and rankings (rather than income compensations). A real world appli-
cation of this validates our theory in Section 3, whilst Section 4 dis-
cusses the implications of our work and related tasks for future work.
Our brief conclusion provides key takeaway messages. Supplementary
materials, including a brief review of historically relevant literature,
provide information for readers interested in further details.
2. Theoretical background
2.1. The original Arrow proof
Arrow (1950) identified six conditions (axioms) that describe in-
dividual and social preferences:
1. If something is preferred to something else it will still be preferred to
something else if it increases in value (more is always better),
2. Something is preferred to something else independent of another
different thing being present or not (Independence of Irrelevant
Alternatives IIA),
3. Any individual preferences are possible (Universality),
4. There does not exist a dictator (i.e. no person or policy dictates the
social preferences), and
5. If all individuals prefer something to something else then the social
preference also prefers it (unanimity).
6. If a good A is preferred to a good B and a good B preferred to a good
C, then good A is preferred to good C (transitivity).
Utilizing these axioms the AI proof is summarized as follows. Let
there be 2 individuals with individual preference relations P1 and P2
that aggregate into either strict social preference P (i.e. by unanimity
axiom xP1y and xP2y implies xPy meaning if both individuals prefer x to
y then the social preference prefers x to y; N.B. that IIA is implicit given
that this is independent of z per the above assumption), or indifferent
social preference I (i.e. by no dictator axiom yP1x and xP2y implies xIy,
N.B. neither individuals 1 or 2 is a dictator of the social preference
given the indifferent social preference) but not both I and P are per-
mitted to hold simultaneously (i.e. a social preference can't be in-
different and also strictly prefer at the same time), for three goods x, y,
z.
Suppose individual 1 has preference ordering xP1yP1z and in-
dividual 2 has ordering zP2xP2y (N.B. these and other preference orders
are allowed because of the universality axiom). Given xP1y and xP2y
then xPy must holds by transitivity. Given yP1z and zP2y then yIz by
non-dictatorship. Therefore, xPy and yIz implies xPz by the transitivity
axiom. But xP1z and zP2x implies xIz by the non-dictator axiom.
Therefore, xPz and xIz holds simultaneously; which contradicts what is
permitted. Hence, no logically consistent social preference satisfying all
6 conditions holds in general (without leading to a logical contra-
diction).
2.2. A two round Arrow (1950) setup with social learning
Arrow (1950) clearly describes a one round social selection setup
i.e. “…[individual preferences are only elicited] once for all and then [a
social benefactor aggregates individual preference and] chooses [the
best social preference] …”. His individuals do not interact, so his set-up
implicitly precludes social learning; it also (implicitly) assumes that
either altruism does not exist, or that if altruism does exist, perfect
information is present3 (with all individual's aware of, and already
account for, the preferences of others). If altruism and imperfect in-
formation co-exist then, a one-off elicitation process cannot identify
social preferences. So what would a two round Arrow (1950) setup with
social learning look like?
AI can result from cyclic social strict preference transitivity i.e. x is
preferred to y which is preferred to z which is preferred to x. So to
identify logically consistent social preferences, one must at least avoid
cyclic transitivity. Black (1948) suggested that this could be achieved
through (possibly) multiple rounds of motions of committees to achieve
3 Imperfect information is present if individual A is initially unaware of in-
dividual B's preferences CROSON, R. 1996. Information in ultimatum games: An
experimental study. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 30, 197.
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the goal of (single peaked) majority rule. But that approach has been
shown to fail (in, for example, the Borda and Condorcet approaches
(Miller, 2017) except when only assessing two candidates (May, 1952;
May, 1953)). We set a similar, but subtly different goal of consensus,
showing that consensus is associated with logically consistent social
preferences and obtainable in just two-rounds. The proofs invoke the set
theoretic analog of the pivotal Grainger et al. (2015) “learning” and
“equilibrium” axioms. Instead of the calculus of Grainger et al. (2015),
the more general set theory notation is used and its generality makes it
more powerful.
2.2.1. Theorem for the two round setup
The following deliberately uses the same set theory notation that
Arrow (1950) employs. It is important to note that indifference, weak
and strong preferences having a specific meaning that is close but not
identical to common usage. This approach is taken in order to show AI
may be circumvented without abandoning Arrow's nomenclature. The
key idea is that AI still exists in the first round, but is resolved in the
second round of a particular 2 round model.
Let xpiny denote that, in round n, individual i is either indifferent or
prefers x to y. It is said that x is weakly preferred to y by individual i in
round n.
Let xPiny denote that, in round n, individual i is not indifferent and
prefers x to y. It is said that x is strictly preferred to y by individual i in
round n.
Let xpSny denote that, in round n, society S is either indifferent or
prefers x to y. It is said that x is weakly preferred to y by society S in
round n.
Let xPSny denote that, in round n, society S is not indifferent and
prefers x to y. It is said that x is strictly preferred to y by society S in
round n.
Let Arrow (1950) axioms hold in two rounds.
Add to the other Arrow (1950) axioms the two following axioms:
Axiom of Learning (AL): if society strictly prefers x to y in the first
round, then all individuals will weakly prefer x to y in the second round
i.e. a strict first round preference means learning from the first round
social announcement (strict preference) may take place. Formally,
xPS1y implies xpi2y for all i.
Axiom of Equilibrium (AE): if society weakly prefers x to y in the
second round, then it must be the case that society strictly preferred x to
y in the first round i.e. a second round weak social preference at the
very least requires a strong first round social announcement (strict
preference). Formally, xpS2y implies xPS1y.
In short, these two additional axioms added to a two round Arrow
(1950) setup is a reasonable and arguably conservative addition. They
establish that AI holds in round 1 as expected with unrestricted do-
mains. In the second round, AL and AE serve to automate a set re-
striction. For example, as will soon be demonstrated, because there is a
second round consensus the no dictator axiom presents no problem
given one person does not govern all persons.
2.2.1.1. Why not something other than AE and AL?. Looking at the
opposite of the logical axioms helps to justify them. Consider the logical
negation of the AE implication here to see this i.e. what one might not
believe is that equilibrium is defined by “both yPS2x and xPS1y are
true”. This does not reflect the notion of equilibrium – hence AE seems
reasonable.
The logical negation of AL is also hard to believe i.e. ypS1x and xpi2y
for all i hold. That is, the negation of AL is saying that a weak social
preference in the first round and a second round consensus in opposi-
tion to it holds. No learning takes place for a first round weak social
preference does not appear to align with the concept of learning – hence
AL seems reasonable.
In short, logical negation offers a guide to what AE and AL axioms
should not be. Specifically, you would not likely want the above ne-
gations to represent AE and AL. Moreover, you would likely wish for the
opposite of those negations. In this light, AL and AE as defined in this
paper seem to be reasonable axioms. However, as in Arrow (1950) they
are debatable e.g. Arrow's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives
(Colignatus, 2008).
2.2.1.2. Imperfect information and altruism. ‘Learning’ implies that (a)
imperfect information is present in round one; and (b) when
information is updated, people update their preferences to better
align with social preferences. This also assumes altruism is present.
AL defines social learning in the syntax (formalism) of axioms – but
semantically (meaning) is that one has imperfect information and
learns altruistically from the social announcement. This results in
second round individual preferences aligned with the first round social
announcement. In contrast to other deliberative approaches allowing
complex multiple social interactions (Orchard-Webb et al., 2016), a
single social announcement (deliberately simple setup) is assumed here.
For example rebellion is not modeled here, as it would introduce ax-
ioms for complex strategic play (Chen et al., 2007); where some in-
dividuals can oppose prior social announcements. Ultimately, the em-
pirical application described in Section 3 provides a good test of the
simple theory of this paper, and a good test for whether altruism (or
rebellion) exists. This study finds evidence of altruism in line with other
research – see, for example the related ultimatum and dictator games
(Camerer and Thaler, 1995).
2.2.1.3. The theorem & proof
2.2.1.3.1. Theorem. Consensus across individuals is a sufficient and
necessary condition for logically consistent social preferences in the
second round.
2.2.1.3.2. Proof. The focus here is on a set of goods that may be
ranked by individual or social preferences.
The seminal proof of Arrow (1950) considered> 2 goods with>1
individual. The following considers the same. That is, given> 2 goods
and> 1 individual in a society, the following holds; given Arrow's
axioms, AL, AE and the usual rules of set theory.
In the first round AI holds as usual. Arrow used a reductio ad ab-
surdum proof i.e. he assumed the opposite of the statement “social
preferences in the first round are logically consistent” is true and if a
contradiction is reached then the statement must be true.
The crux of the current proof also utilizes a reductio ad absurdum
proof. Specifically, if one assumes that “social preferences in the second
round are not logically consistent” a contradiction is reached, and
therefore logically consistent social preferences must exist in this two
round setup.
In the second round social learning occurs to circumvent AI as fol-
lows.
AE (xpS2y implies xPS1y) and AL (xPS1y implies xpi2y for all i) result
in xpS2y implies xpi2y for all i (i.e. consensus is a necessary condition).
Then xpi2y for all i implies xpS2y by the axiom of unanimity (i.e. con-
sensus is a sufficient condition).
Now assume “social preferences in the second round are not logi-
cally consistent”. This means that there must be at least two goods x, y
such that yPS2x and xpS2y i.e. the social preference is not logically
consistent because they contradict one another. But this is not possible
because of the following.
Starting with xpS2y and using the usual rules of logical deduction
means a contradiction is reached whereby yPS2x is false. Hence the
assumption is false and “social preferences in the second round are
logically consistent”.
Starting with xpS2y then implies xPS1y by AE, which implies xpi2y for
all i by AL, which implies xpS2y by AU, which contradicts with the as-
sumption yPS2x. Therefore, a contradiction has been reached, and it
must be the case that “social preferences in the second round are lo-
gically consistent”. QED.
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2.2.2. Real world predictions motivated by the theorem
The theorem uses the same fundamental nomenclature as Arrow
(1950) with metamathematical adaptations that are not atypical
(Mihara, 1997). For example, the preference relation nomenclature has
been modified to reflect rounds. Importantly, rounds are connected by
AL and AE axioms. Ultimately, the theorem suggests that, in the second
round, a consensus is reached and logically consistent social pre-
ferences hold. This implies two real world predictions for such a system:
1) Convergence to a consensus occurs from round 1 to round 2 - a
direct statement of the theorem.
2) CSGs are more affected by social announcements than SIGs - given
the presence of social learning.
Convergence to a logically consistent social preference consensus
becomes probable (rather than certain) in the real world. Therefore,
real world empirical testing of the theoretical predictions is desirable.
3. Empirical application
3.1. Overview
The board of an (Australian) Aboriginal Corporation (the Ewamian
Aboriginal Corporation (EAC)) participated in the application of the
theory – EAC being charged with determining which of numerous
complex projects and programs are likely to best serve the needs of their
community. Hence, EAC was considered a suitable context to imple-
ment a version of the real world web-app of the Grainger et al. (2015)
decision market game aligned to the aforementioned theory. The dy-
namics observed in this real world social settings are not expected to
identically mimic the theorem (in Section 2.2), but the theory proposed
in this paper can be validated via testing the two (theorem implied)
predictions. To this end, data collected during the live EAC ‘game’
(using the tool) was used to test the predictions. This empirical data was
then used to generate an estimate of the valuation of the diverse pro-
jects considered in the game by EAC.
3.2. Decision-making context & justification as case study to test theory
3.2.1. Background
The web-app designed by Grainger et al. (2015) was adjusted for use
with eight board members of EAC. The Ewamian people have tradi-
tional lands in the Einasleigh Uplands region, inland from Cairns, in
North Eastern Australia. They were disposed of their lands in the late
19th century through European colonization and government policies.
Although many Ewamian people remained in areas near their tradi-
tional lands, many were forcibly transported to other regions and living
near traditional lands surrounding Atherton/Mareeba/Cairns and also
around Brisbane and Cherbourg. The EAC was registered as a Pre-
scribed Body Corporate (PBC) in 1994, to support an application for
Native Title. They were successful and were granted Native Title
over> 29,000 km2 of Ewamian land part of which was declared as an
Indigenous Protected Area (IPA) of Australia's National Reserve System.
3.2.2. Justification as case study to test theory
The principal objective of the EAC is social – the board's aim being
to make decisions that improve the (social) welfare of Ewamian people
– wherever they may live. The Ewamian board is thus a particularly
good setting in which to trial the proposed method for identifying lo-
gically consistent social preferences for environmental and other
goods/services. Ultimately, EAC board, each having individual and
social interests, deliberates to identify a ranking of CSGs to the benefit
of Ewamian. Hence the theoretical setup agrees well with the EAC
context. EAC as a research partner agreed to use the web-app willingly;
all well knowing it was a web-app under test. As such, EAC was a logical
opportunity for this research.
3.3. Methods
The following method is not unlike the market stall deliberative
approach (Hansjürgens et al., 2017). An important difference lies in the
use of a social announcement (via the web tool), rather than a social
discussion of willingness to pay. The social announcement is utilized as
it aligns directly with the theory proposed (in Section 2.2). A social
announcement simplifies the logical proofs; as is typically done in in-
formation market literature (Chen et al., 2004; Grainger et al., 2015).
One can see, in contrast, multiple interactions complicate the setting.
The algorithms that ensure logically consistent aggregation were pro-
vided in Grainger et al. (2015) and Grainger (2017).
EAC board members were asked to rank 7 diverse projects relevant
to their people. All goods may be seen as both individual and social –
each good being somewhere on a spectrum between these extremes.
Some of the projects could easily be considered a CSG (e.g. supporting
Indigenous land management (ranger) programs on their Indigenous
Protected Area), and some better described as SIGs (e.g. Board pay in-
creases and electricity rebates). Projects and their assignment to CSG,
SIG or both are listed in Table 1; where the Board nominated projects 4,
5 and 6 and the researchers nominated the remainder.
The game was designed to allow for multiple rounds interspersed
with a ‘social announcement (Grainger, 2017); also called a score.
However, when implemented, there was rapid convergence by the
second round (see Section 3.4.2), so participants were not asked to
continue beyond round two. The first round required the board mem-
bers to provide (secret) individual assessments (votes/guesses) of the
desirability of each project. They were asked to ‘guess' the likelihood
that each project would, when all assessments were considered to-
gether, be rated as one of the best projects for the Community. Each
Board member was provided with an individual ‘voting sheet’ that
listed all seven projects, and asked to allocate each a mark on a scale
from 0 to 10; whereby 10 represented the highest chance of a project
being picked by the Board. This aligns with the concept of common
knowledge i.e. each person bases their decisions on what they think
others think that they… etc. (Aumann, 1976). Such a setup is simply an
aggregation of information – they are in fact equivalent to attaining the
Table 1
Summary of projects with details of good, round one and round two mean and standard deviation of guesses – deeper analysis required.
Name Nominated by Type of
good
Round 1 mean
guess
Round 1 standard
deviation
Round 2 mean
guess
Round 2 standard
deviation
More Ewamian Land Management Programs Researchers CSG 86% 14% 89% 10%
Electricity House Rebate $20 per Week Researchers SIG 58% 20% 71% 23%
Govt Increasing PBC Board and Employee
Payments
Researchers SIG 61% 23% 71% 16%
Build Solar Farm Talaroo Board CSG 92% 11% 93% 13%
Ewamian Enterprise Artifact Making Board CSG 77% 13% 84% 12%
Housing On Country Board CSG 79% 17% 89% 9%
Do Something Else Researchers CSG or SIG 58% 15% 67% 13%
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best possible prediction/decision as mentioned in Grainger et al.
(2015).
The decision-market algorithm described in Grainger et al. (2015)
was implemented in the game and used to aggregate guesses into a
score, and to also allocate rewards to board members: the closer their
guess was to the score, the higher their reward.4 Use of rewards in this
way, is in line with other applications in information markets and has
been shown to ensure that final outcomes aligns with the best possible
decisions (Grainger et al., 2015; Grainger, 2017). At the end of the first
round the project scores and rewards for board members were shared
with all on a scoreboard. This served as the end of round 1 social an-
nouncement. The Board was then asked to re-assess the projects in a
second (final) round in light of the social announcement (scores). This
provided each individual with the opportunity to update their previous
guesses if they so wished. The tool/game was used to update social
preferences/scores, with final results shared and discussed with the
board.
Analysis of data collected in the game to test predictions (1) and (2)
was performed. The means and standard deviations of all guesses for all
projects and both rounds are reported. This motivated deeper statistical
analysis. As such, the theoretical prediction of convergence to unani-
mity can be tested for using the definition of “distance”. Distance here is
formally defined as the absolute difference between the individual
guess and the average guess (across all participants and projects) in a
round. In this way, distance is a function of rounds and independent of
projects and individuals. If rounds increase and distance decreases, then
convergence is said to be occurring from round 1 to round 2 (prediction
1). The test for convergence utilized a logit regression of the binary
response variable for round R (whereby 0 denotes round 1 and 1 de-
notes rounds subsequent to round 1) on the explanatory variable for
distance D (of the individual guess from the mean guess for the round)
and the control function residual e(D) (used to control for confounding
and endogeneity (Lewbel et al., 2012; Dong and Lewbel, 2015)).
The theoretical prediction of CSGs being differently affected, by the
social announcement, than SIGs (prediction 2), is also testable with the
“distance” concept. Convergence being larger for CSGs than for SIGs
was tested. Here too, a logit regression was used for the binary response
variable for CSG status S (whereby 1 denotes a CSG and 0 denotes a
simple individual good) on the explanatory variable for distance D in-
dividual guess from the mean guess for the round and the control
function residual e(D) (Lewbel et al., 2012; Dong and Lewbel, 2015).
The theoretical prediction of the link between guesses, CSGs, and
rounds was also tested. Because the guesses in the game are bounded
between 0 and 1, the log odds of the guesses are regressed onto CSGs
and rounds.
Given that the scoreboard provides an incentive compatible best
possible prediction, it is used to generate an estimate of the ‘value’ of
each project (Grainger, 2017). A suitable payment vehicle that is fa-
miliar to participants is used to do so (Cook et al., 2018). A typical
single round valuation (using the means of guesses) is also performed
and compared to the valuation generated using the scoreboard.5 Ana-
lysis suggests that typical valuation leads to greater undervaluation of
CSGs than SIGs.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Observations summarized and justifying further analysis
Due to the sensitive nature of the EAC game data, the guesses
provided by each individual participant are only attainable by request
conditioned upon authorized release. However, a summary of in-
formation relating to respondent guesses for each project across both
rounds is presented in Table 1. The mean values of guesses for each
project appear to increase from round 1 to round 2. The associated
standard deviations appear to decrease from round 1 to round 2. Taken
together, Table 1 is suggestive of convergence from below. However,
deeper statistical analysis needs to be performed on the raw game data
to determine this; particularly given the variation in standard devia-
tions in Table 1. This is undertaken in Tables 2 to 4 and depicts con-
vergence to a consensus from rounds 1 to 2 at a 1% significance level,
and greater undervaluation of CSGs than SIGs at a 5% significance
level. Table 5 allows us to assess the empirical extent of the under-
valuation.
3.4.2. Tests for convergence
Table 2 shows results from the logit regression of round (R) on
distance (D) (of individual guesses) from mean (of guesses across all
respondents) – the test of prediction 1. These results suggest that the
distance of a player's guess from the mean decreases from round 1 to
round 2. Specifically, the coefficient of D being negative, suggests that
as distance decreases the chance of being in a round after the first round
increases. That is, convergence to unanimity is likely occurring from
round 1 to round 2 in a statistically significant way as predicted by
theory, for all goods. The control function properly produces a clean
error; and was required as it indicates the presence of endogeneity and
confounding. The large coefficient for distance suggests that con-
vergence for all goods is rapid. In addition, the Board discussed and
agreed with the round 2 rankings (of Table 1) when asked i.e. a con-
sensus appeared to have been formed by the end of round 2; adding to
the confirmation of theory.
3.4.3. Tests for differences between simple individual and complex social
goods
Table 3 shows results relevant to prediction two, undertaken using a
logit regression of CSG status (CSG) on distance D. Evidently, an in-
crease in distance corresponds to a decrease in the probability of the
good being a complex social one. The control function produced a clean
error in the presence of detected confounding and endogeneity. The
analysis underpinning results from Table 2 validates convergence from
round 1 to round 2 for all goods. This additional analysis shows that,
when both types of goods converge to a similar region around the mean,
then CSGs converge from a greater distance. Specifically, blind in-
dividual guesses (distances) which do not adequately capture benefits
that accrue to others (the community more broadly) occur in round 1. It
is round 2 that demarcates CSGs and SIGs; arguably because of the
different way people respond to social announcements. The information
embedded within the social announcement thus has less impact on
assessments of SIGs than on CSGs – as we have defined them. We note
that different definitions, or similar definitions in different contexts,
would generate different results. Although subject to empirical testing,
we suggest that the general finding, that CSGs are undervalued by in-
dividualistic assessment methods is likely to hold. We also note, in this
application, CSGs show a significantly greater rate of convergence than
SIGs.
Further investigation into the nature of CSGs, relative to SIGs, is
represented in the regression of Table 4. It demonstrates that, all else
being equal, CSGs status contributes to the individual guess of a project
at< 1% statistical significance level. In short, statistical analysis de-
monstrates it is highly unlikely that there is no difference between SIGs
and CSGs.
4 The score and rewards makes guesses incentive compatible i. e. individuals
maximize their chance of reward when they submit truthful guesses informed
by the latest score (information). The score is then updated to reflect all re-
levant information needed for the next round of guesses i.e. the score is a best
possible prediction.
5 In the game, scores provide a best possible (probability) prediction and
guesses act like bids. Maximizing the entropy of the “product of bid, probability
and scaling factor” implies an optimum at which the “product of bid and
probability” is a constant. This then implies that valuations derived using a
ratio of probabilities are the same as those using the reciprocal of the ratio of
bids.
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3.4.4. Valuation
It is not always appropriate to convert preferences to dollar values
(Cook et al., 2018). However, we use a payment vehicle that is likely
familiar to the board i.e., “Electricity House Rebate $20 per Week”. In
so doing, we are able to generate the valuations depicted in Table 5. A
comparison is made between valuations generated using the scores in
the game and more typical valuations made using single round means.
The score may be simply considered as a weighted average of in-
dividual guesses. The score is required to generate social announce-
ments that make the game incentive compatible i.e., winning the game
is aligned with the desired social objective. Specifically, these scores
were generated by inputting data collected from each board member
into the algorithm described in Grainger (2017). The algorithm is best
described as a simple weighted average of the Shapley-Shubik kind
(Grainger et al., 2015). That is, the score is a weighted average of all
individual guesses made; by calculating the ratio of project specific
scores to our chosen monetary ‘numeraire’ project ($20 per week
electricity rebate), we can infer monetary values of other projects.
It is in round 2 that convergence to a consensus occurs. Therefore, a
valuation range, for round 2, is of interest. A 99% confidence interval
for the particular score distribution is used to estimate the lower and
upper bound score-derived valuation in Table 5. Given the probability
density function is complex, this was undertaken by applying the
Tchebychev inequality to the score algorithm to arrive at:
⎡
⎣
⎢ − <
−
−
⎤
⎦
⎥ >P x p
p r r
r n n
| |
20 ( )
( 1)
99%n
n n
n
2
1
where x is a point, pn the mean, r relevant information level, n number
of guesses .
This simply means that irrespective of the functional form of the
probability distribution, a point estimate is rejected at a 1% significance
level if it lies> 10 standard deviations from the mean of the probability
distribution.
Table 5 depicts the lower and upper bounds of the score distribution
at a distance of 10 standard deviations from the mean. Any point es-
timate outside of the lower-upper region is rejected at the 1% sig-
nificance level. Rather than working with scores, we look at the ratio of
the simple mean of round 1 guesses (relative to the monetary numer-
aire) to draw inferences about the values that would obtain in a single-
round study. With the exception of “Do something else” all mean values
derived from this simple valuation approach are statistically different
from the values generated using round two scores at the 1% level. That
is, the typical 1 round valuation undervalues all goods.
In addition, Table 5 shows that mean values associated with CSGs,
derived from second round scores are almost double the value estimates
derived from the first-round ‘guesses’; the differences in values for SIGs
are much smaller.. This is pima-facie suggestive of greater under-
valuation of CSGs than SIGs. More formally, a t-test performed on the
lower bound score-derived valuation and the typical round 1 mean
guesses derived valuation finds that the latter is undervalued at a 1%
significance level. A simple logit regression of CSG status on the va-
luations identifies threshold values exist below which all goods are
CSG. Combining these insights with the previous analysis, a typical
single round valuation undervalues CSGs more than SIGs. This bias
would lead to the crowding out of CSGs if decisions were only informed
by single-round valuation exercises.
4. Discussion
4.1. The need for a validated deliberative valuation theory
Deliberative market valuation is considered important to eliciting
social preferences but lacks sufficient theoretical underpinnings (Bunse
et al., 2015). Kenter (2016) issues a challenge to determine value for-
mation from the individual level to the group level in terms of con-
vergence or divergence. This study responds to these needs. It does this
by first establishing a theory to circumvent AI. It then validates the
theoretical predictions in an appropriate real world Indigenous orga-
nization.
Table 2
Logit regression of Round on Distance from mean guess.
R Coefficient Std. error p-Value
D −36.7 6.6 0.00
e(D) 37.7 6.7 0.00
Constant 5.9 1.0 0.00
Observations= 140
LLR=55.09
Table 3
Logit regression of CSG on Distance from mean guess.
CS Coefficient Std. error p-Value
D −12.4 4.3 0.00
e(D) 10.8 4.8 0.02
Constant 2.9 0.7 0.00
Observations= 140
LLR=10.2
Table 4
Linear regression of the log odds of the individual guess (L) on CSG status (CSG)
and round (R).
L Coefficient Std. error p-Value
CSG 1.0 0.2 0.00
R 0.6 0.2 0.00
e(CSG) −1.4 0.4 0.00
e(R) −1.1 0.5 0.03
Constant 1.0 0.3 0.00
Observations= 110
F(4, 105) =12.33
Table 5
Non-market valuation range (denoted in $).
Name Round 2 Scores Lower $ (using
scores)
Mean $ (using
scores)
Upper $ (using
scores)
$ (estimated from round 1 mean
guesses)
More Ewamian Land Management Programs - CSG 91% $24.08 $24.46 $24.86 $13.45
Electricity House Rebate $20 per Week - SIG 75% $20.00 $20.00 $20.00 $20.00
Govt Increasing PBC Board and Employee Payments -
SIG
78% $20.72 $20.87 $21.02 $18.97
Build Solar Farm Talaroo - CSG 96% $25.39 $25.66 $25.93 $12.48
Ewamian Enterprise Artifact Making - CSG 86% $22.98 $23.03 $23.07 $14.93
Housing On Country - CSG 90% $23.67 $24.03 $24.40 $14.51
Do Something Else – CSG/SIG 78% $19.76 $21.03 $22.26 $20.00
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4.2. The response to the need for a validated deliberative valuation theory
This study confirms that logically consistent social preferences are
possible in a two round deliberative valuation of the type here. It also
finds that CSGs are the ones most affected by (deliberative) social
learning and likely undervalued if only a single round preference eli-
citation is utilized. This highlights the practical implications of this
study: when valuing CSGs a two round deliberative approach is very
likely required to appropriately inform their ranking and/or valuation.
Assessments of SIGs, on the other hand, may not require a deliberative
step; although caution may be required when they exhibit complex
interdependencies.
4.3. Deliberative process link to information markets
Estimating the social preferences and the associated valuation of
CSGs is best done using deliberative approaches – which include, but
are not limited to, the web-game used in this study. See, for example,
Sagoff (1998) who argues that contingent valuation studies which
evolve to incorporate deliberate processes will generate better assess-
ment than valuation tasks which do not; an argument supported by the
theory and empirics of this paper. This is possibly due to deliberation
creating a more democratic version of contingent valuation (Schläpfer,
2017). Contingent valuation performed in a deliberative way is a means
to aggregate collective wisdom; with representativeness of the popu-
lation considered important (Kenter et al., 2016). Information markets
also aggregate information into best possible predictions (Chen et al.,
2004). For example, the Iowa Electronic Market is an information
market (Berg et al., 2008) which may be considered a deliberative
process; given it aggregates collective wisdom (Brown et al., 2019).
4.4. Information markets motivate a theory for deliberative approaches
Deliberative approaches allow one to elicit individual preferences in
the first round, to inform deliberation and preferences in the second
round. The knowledge that is exchanged during the deliberation/in-
teractions corrects information imperfections. This is consistent with
information markets, upon which the theory of this paper is based.
Concerns of plural values and incommensurability can be resolved as
common knowledge lays a common foundation for comparisons to be
had. The key takeaway from this study is that social preferences and
valuation become logically consistent in the second round when social
learning occurs.
4.5. Validating the deliberative approach theory of this paper
Whilst tested in an Indigenous context, the application of this study
is broader. The web-app and deliberative approaches inform social
decision-making. It sounds obvious that social decisions require a the-
oretical and practical setup that allows discussion about a wide range of
values, criteria and objectives i.e., the sharing of information. This
paper simply extends the seminal work of Arrow (1950) into a delib-
erative theoretical model. Using the same proof approach (reduction ad
absurdum), this paper shows that a contradiction arises if one assumes
it is not possible to attain a logically consistent social preference in the
second round. This is theoretically proven and empirically demon-
strated in this paper.
Our empirical demonstration presents both scores and valuations,
which tell a consistent story. Valuation should be performed only when
appropriate, with a suitable payment vehicle (that is not necessarily
money), and with a deliberative (social learning) process if CSGs are
being valued. In short, social learning and the incentive compatible
scoring, such as the one in this study, ultimately arrives at logically
consistent social preferences.
4.6. Limitations of this study
As with Arrow, the proof (in this paper) is only as strong as its ax-
ioms. However, most of the axioms utilized here are from the seminal
Arrow (1950) work. Therefore they have stood the test of time.
However, Arrow's single round theoretical model does not arrive at
logically consistent social preferences. In contrast, our model resolves
commensurability and values pluralism concerns given it does arrive at
logically consistent social preferences in two rounds. Our new (AL and
AE) axioms are as debatable as was Arrow's. However, they are argu-
ably as reasonable as his. The litmus test for AL and AE reasonability
performed in our study was simply to consider if these axioms were
false. In so doing, unreasonable logical statements resulted. Therefore,
we can say that AL and AE are not unreasonable axioms.
4.7. Practical measures for future valuation
The empirical application presented here asked participants to
simply rate projects. Neoclassical non-market valuation methods could
also be adapted to allow social learning and thus derive social values.
For example, a standard choice modelling study could be implemented
using existing rules/practices in a first round assessment. Results could
be aggregated, shared and deliberated using an incentive compatible
algorithm to inform a second-round assessment. Our algorithm also
allows for asynchronous assessments, so if aiming to elicit preferences
from a relatively large number of respondents, researchers would not
need more funding to implement the study in two distinct surveys.
Nowadays, many stated preference studies are implemented in an on-
line environment. So operationally, researchers could recruit a re-
spondent, elicit their first round preferences and inform respondent of
the updated social preferences. The respondent could then immediately
update their preference. Finally, logically consistent social preferences
would be announced to the group to inform their priorities and va-
luations.
5. Conclusion
We have provided a theoretical proof that two-round preference
elicitation processes incorporating social learning can lead to logically
consistent social preferences. The first round exhibits AI – it is the
second round (following social learning) that establishes logically
consistent social preferences. In stark contrast to the one-round AI
setup, social learning is implied in a deliberative process (Kenter et al.,
2015), our core message being that deliberative processes are not ne-
cessarily vulnerable to AI.
We show that social learning operates to automatically restrict in-
dividual preferences to ensure second round logically consistent social
preferences. This insight is also novel and markedly different to pre-
viously suggested approaches to circumventing AI which requires re-
searchers to excise potentially problematic individual preferences (Sen,
1999; Inada, 1969). Restriction through social learning is not only more
intuitively palatable but is computationally tractable (as demonstrated
in our real world implementation). Importantly, our setup does not
restrict the board to have purely individual or social preferences in
either round – it is simply suggesting that there will be convergence to a
consensus (in the maximum likelihood sense) of the social preference
from round 1 to round 2.
Quantitative results from this study add weight to the theoretical
foundations presented in this paper. Specifically, the theoretical pre-
dictions are validated using a (web) tool/game aligned with the the-
orem of this paper, and built using insights from information markets
(Grainger, 2017; Grainger et al., 2015). The two theoretical predictions
that follow from the theoretical proofs are empirically tested, and
supported using statistical analysis of data. These were:
• Convergence to a consensus across individuals would occur from
D. Grainger and N. Stoeckl Ecological Economics 164 (2019) 106339
7
round one to round two
• SIGs would not be as affected by social announcements as CSGs.
CSGs were found to be undervalued (relative to SIGs) in a single
round setup. A two-round setup corrected this undervaluation.
Specifically, it is more likely that the second round leads to a best
possible prediction/decision/valuation than the first round (Chen et al.,
2004; Grainger, 2017; Grainger et al., 2015). Therefore, CSGs are more
likely undervalued in the first round than overvalued in the second
round. This adds weight to similar previous comments made by re-
searchers about the importance of deliberative processes for social
choice (Himes and Muraca, 2018; Chan et al., 2018)).
The web-tool that we used here (which facilitates a deliberative
process) could be adapted for use in innumerable other situations (three
separate projects underway by authors include studies of the relative
‘value’ of: research projects; suicide prevention strategies; and en-
vironmental management activities). Perhaps more importantly, our
insights open doors for other researchers to develop new (two-step)
social learning applications. The takeaway of this study is that logically
consistent social preferences are indeed possible when social learning
occurs.
Statements
Competing interests statement
The authors whose names are listed above certify that they have NO
affiliations with or involvement in any organization or entity with any
financial interest (such as honoraria; educational grants; participation
in speakers' bureaus; membership, employment, consultancies, stock
ownership, or other equity interest; and expert testimony or patent-
licensing arrangements), or non-financial interest (such as personal or
professional relationships, affiliations, knowledge or beliefs) in the
subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript.
Financial disclosure statement
I certify that no party having a direct interest in the results of the
research supporting this article has or will confer a benefit on me or on
any organization with which I am associated AND, if applicable, I
certify that all financial and material support for this research and work
are clearly identified in the title page of the manuscript.
Data statement
Due to the sensitive nature of the data collected in this study,
workshop participants were assured raw data would remain con-
fidential and would not be shared.
Ethics statement
This research was performed with ethics approval per James Cook
University Ethics Number: (JCU) H6500.
Acknowledgements
Ewamian Aboriginal Corporation Board (Australia).
Dr. Diane Jarvis (James Cook University, Townsville, Australia).
The Australian Government's National Environmental Science
Program (Project 5.3 of the Northern Australian Environmental
Resources Hub)
The Australian Research Council
James Cook University
The reviewers and journal editor, whose suggestions have, we be-
lieve, markedly improved the manuscript.
The views expressed herein are not necessarily of those
acknowledged.
Funding sources
This work was supported by:
Funding from the Australian Government's National Environmental
Science Program [Project 5.3 of the Northern Australian Environmental
Resources Hub].
The Australian Research Council (Discovery Indigenous Scheme)
[Grant number IN190100061, 2019].
James Cook University Australia.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.05.019.
References
Arias-Arévalo, P., Gómez-Baggethun, E., Martín-López, B., Pérez-Rincón, M., 2018.
Widening the evaluative space for ecosystem services: a taxonomy of plural values
and valuation methods. Environ. Val. 27, 29–53.
Aumann, R.J., 1976. Agreeing to disagree. Ann. Stat. 1236–1239.
Batavia, C., Nelson, M.P., 2017. For goodness sake! What is intrinsic value and why
should we care? Biol. Conserv. 209, 366–376.
Berg, J.E., Nelson, F.D., Rietz, T.A., 2008. Prediction market accuracy in the long run. Int.
J. Forecast. 24, 285–300.
Black, D., 1948. On the rationale of group decision-making. J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23–34.
Braat, L.C., De Groot, R., 2012. The ecosystem services agenda: bridging the worlds of
natural science and economics, conservation and development, and public and pri-
vate policy. Ecosyst. Serv. 1, 4–15.
Brown, A., Reade, J.J., Williams, L.V., 2019. When are prediction market prices most
informative? Int. J. Forecast. 35, 420–428.
Bullock, C., Joyce, D., Collier, M., 2018. An exploration of the relationships between
cultural ecosystem services, socio-cultural values and well-being. Ecosyst. Serv. 31,
142–152.
Bunse, L., Rendon, O., Luque, S., 2015. What can deliberative approaches bring to the
monetary valuation of ecosystem services? A literature review. Ecosyst. Serv. 14,
88–97.
Camerer, C.F., Thaler, R.H., 1995. Anomalies: ultimatums, dictators and manners. J.
Econ. Perspect. 9, 209–219.
Chan, K.M., Balvanera, P., Benessaiah, K., Chapman, M., Díaz, S., Gómez-Baggethun, E.,
Gould, R., Hannahs, N., Jax, K., Klain, S., 2016. Opinion: why protect nature?
Rethinking values and the environment. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 113, 1462–1465.
Chan, K.M., Gould, R.K., Pascual, U., 2018. Editorial Overview: Relational Values: What
Are they, and What's the Fuss about? Elsevier.
Chen, Y., Mullen, T., Chu, C.-H., 2004. Theoretical investigation of prediction markets
with aggregate uncertainty. In: Proceedings of the Seventh International Conference
on Electronic Commerce Research (ICECR-7). Citeseer.
Chen, Y., Reeves, D.M., Pennock, D.M., Hanson, R.D., Fortnow, L., Gonen, R., 2007.
Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets. In: International Workshop on
Web and Internet Economics. Springer, pp. 70–81.
Colignatus, T., 2008. Review of Howard DeLong (1991), “A Refutation of Arrow's
Theorem”, With a Reaction, Also on Its Relevance in 2008 for the European Union.
Cook, D., Davíðsdóttir, B., Kristófersson, D.M., 2017. An ecosystem services perspective
for classifying and valuing the environmental impacts of geothermal power projects.
Energy Sustain. Dev. 40, 126–138.
Cook, D., Davíðsdóttir, B., Kristófersson, D.M., 2018. Willingness to pay for the pre-
servation of geothermal areas in Iceland–the contingent valuation studies of Eldvörp
and Hverahlíð. Renew. Energy 116, 97–108.
Daw, T.M., Coulthard, S., Cheung, W.W., Brown, K., Abunge, C., Galafassi, D., Peterson,
G.D., Mcclanahan, T.R., Omukoto, J.O., Munyi, L., 2015. Evaluating taboo trade-offs
in ecosystems services and human well-being. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 201414900.
Dong, Y., Lewbel, A., 2015. A simple estimator for binary choice models with endogenous
regressors. Econ. Rev. 34, 82–105.
Gómez-Baggethun, E., Ruiz-Pérez, M., 2011. Economic valuation and the commodifica-
tion of ecosystem services. Prog. Phys. Geogr. 35, 613–628.
Grainger, D.A., 2017. The Application of Prediction Markets to Project Prioritization in
the Not-for-Profit Sector. James Cook University.
Grainger, D., Sun, S., Watkin-Lui, F., Case, P., 2015. A simple decision market model. J.
Predict. Markets 9, 41–63.
Hansjürgens, B., Schröter-Schlaack, C., Berghöfer, A., Lienhoop, N., 2017. Justifying so-
cial values of nature: economic reasoning beyond self-interested preferences. Ecosyst.
Serv. 23, 9–17.
Himes, A., Muraca, B., 2018. Relational values: the key to pluralistic valuation of eco-
system services. Curr. Opin. Environ. Sustain. 35, 1–7.
Inada, K.-I., 1969. The simple majority decision rule. Econometrica 490–506.
Kallis, G., Gómez-Baggethun, E., Zografos, C., 2013. To value or not to value? That is not
the question. Ecol. Econ. 94, 97–105.
Kenter, J.O., O'brien, L., Hockley, N., Ravenscroft, N., Fazey, I., Irvine, K.N., Reed, M.S.,
D. Grainger and N. Stoeckl Ecological Economics 164 (2019) 106339
8
Christie, M., Brady, E., Bryce, R., 2015. What are shared and social values of eco-
systems? Ecol. Econ. 111, 86–99.
Kenter, J.O., Bryce, R., Christie, M., Cooper, N., Hockley, N., Irvine, K.N., Fazey, I.,
O'brien, L., Orchard-Webb, J., Ravenscroft, N., 2016. Shared values and deliberative
valuation: future directions. Ecosyst. Serv. 21, 358–371.
Lewbel, A., Dong, Y., Yang, T.T., 2012. Comparing features of convenient estimators for
binary choice models with endogenous regressors. Can. J. Econ./Rev. Can.
d'économique 45, 809–829.
May, K.O., 1952. A set of independent necessary and sufficient conditions for simple
majority decision. Econometrica 680–684.
May, K.O., 1953. A note on the complete independence of the conditions for simple
majority decision. Econometrica 21, 172 (pre-1986).
Mihara, H.R., 1997. Arrow's theorem and Turing computability. Economic Theory 10,
257–276.
Miller, N.R., 2017. Reflections on Arrow's theorem and voting rules. Public Choice 1–12.
Oberheim, E., Hoyningen-Huene, P., 2009. The Incommensurability of Scientific
Theories.
Orchard-Webb, J., Kenter, J.O., Bryce, R., Church, A., 2016. Deliberative democratic
monetary valuation to implement the ecosystem approach. Ecosyst. Serv. 21,
308–318.
Rawluk, A., Ford, R., Anderson, N., Williams, K., 2019. Exploring multiple dimensions of
values and valuing: a conceptual framework for mapping and translating values for
social-ecological research and practice. Sustain. Sci. 1–14.
Sagoff, M., 1998. Aggregation and deliberation in valuing environmental public goods: a
look beyond contingent pricing. Ecol. Econ. 24, 213–230.
Schläpfer, F., 2017. Deliberative monetary valuation (DMV) and democratic valuation
(DV): a response to Bartkowski and Lienhoop (2017). Ecol. Econ. 141, 261–264.
Schulz, C., Martin-Ortega, J., 2018. Quantifying relational values—why not? Curr. Opin.
Environ. Sustain.
Sen, A., 1977. Social choice theory: a re-examination. Econometrica 53–89.
Sen, A., 1999. The possibility of social choice. Am. Econ. Rev. 89, 349–378.
Šešelja, D., Strasse, C., 2013. Kuhn and the question of pursuit worthiness. Topoi 32,
9–19.
Stoeckl, N., Hicks, C., Farr, M., Grainger, D., Esparon, M., Thomas, J., Larson, S., 2018.
The crowding out of complex social goods. Ecol. Econ. 144, 65–72.
Tadaki, M., Sinner, J., Chan, K.M., 2017. Making sense of environmental values: a ty-
pology of concepts. Ecol. Soc. 22.
Tversky, A., Simonson, I., 1993. Context-dependent preferences. Manag. Sci. 39,
1179–1189.
D. Grainger and N. Stoeckl Ecological Economics 164 (2019) 106339
9
